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Abstract
Trust is essential for social interactions, cooperation and social order. Research has shown
that social status and common group memberships are important determinants of receiving
and reciprocating trust. However, social status and group membership can coincide or
diverge–with potentially different effects. Our study contributes to the existing literature on
the role of status and group membership by testing two separate trust-generating mecha-
nisms against each other. We examine if individuals tend to place trust in high-status groups
(irrespective of their own group membership) or, rather, if they tend to trust others with
whom they share a common group membership. We assume that status group membership
is signalled by cultural (musical) taste. This operationalization follows the theoretical reason-
ing of Bourdieu who argues that it is, above all, musical taste that classifies persons of differ-
ent status. By demonstrating their “legitimate” cultural taste, upper-class members
distinguish themselves from the middle and lower classes and signal their social status,
thereby creating awe, respect and an air of trustworthiness. We report evidence from online
experiments with incentivized trust games, which enable us to separate the two trust-gener-
ating mechanisms. We find no evidence that persons with “legitimate” tastes are generally
trusted more. Instead, our results clearly demonstrate ingroup favouritism towards persons
with a similar taste. Participants place more trust in members of their own group and expect
them to be more trustworthy. In other words: members of taste-based groups trust each
other more than members of different-taste-based groups. Interestingly, this group-based
trust is not always justified inasmuch as received trust is not necessarily reciprocated more
strongly by own group members. This suggests that ingroup favouritism is, at least in part,
driven by false beliefs.
Introduction
Placing trust in trustworthy individuals is key for establishing collective goods, cooperation
and collaboration and has far-reaching consequences for the order, development and prosper-
ity of societies [1,2]. Since different individuals in different situations vary considerably in
their level of trustworthiness and cooperativeness [3,4], choices of whom to trust have to be
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made on many occasions in every individual’s daily life and can, in the case of misplaced trust,
result in substantial losses. Making well-informed decisions may be easy when we have previ-
ous experiences with our interaction partners. In contemporary societies, however, placing
trust in the right people has become increasingly demanding. With progressing economic and
political globalisation, growing mobility and increasing numbers of connections with weak
ties, more and more interactions take place between strangers [5–8]. Thus, in many situations,
individuals do not have sufficient information on whether their interaction partners are trust-
worthy or not.
Decisions of whom to trust can be based on a wide range of cues and characteristics, such
as personal traits of the trustee–for instance, his or her voice–, the nature of the relationship
between trustor and trustee or situational aspects, such as the mood of the involved individuals
[9,10]. Sociologically more relevant, however, are social characteristics, such as social status
and group membership of the trustor and the trustee [11]. In the present study, we focus on
this aspect.
We consider two ways in which membership of social groups may affect trust and trustwor-
thiness: We investigate if individuals trust others with high social status or, rather, others with
whom they share a mutual social group. Following extant work in sociology [12,13], we assume
that status group membership is signalled via cultural tastes–in our case, musical preferences.
Thus, we do not focus on very specific forms of social status (such as the status that comes with
being a celebrity or politician). Instead, we measure status in general terms by employing
music preferences as a proxy for perceived social status in terms of education, income and
occupation, which are conventionally used in the social sciences to measure social status for all
members of contemporary societies [14]. High-status culture is often operationalized via a
preference for classical music. Thus, we study one group of classical music lovers and one of
folk music lovers. This allows an empirical comparison of two competing mechanisms: are
people with high-status tastes trusted more (irrespective of one’s own status) or do people trust
others with the same group membership more (independently of whether they have high or
low social status)? In other words, we test a signalling mechanism (cultural taste as a signal of
status group membership) against ingroup favouritism. Both mechanisms may work together
in real social life–however, our experimental design enables us to disentangle them
empirically.
While only few studies have shed light on the relevance of group status for trusting behav-
iour [15,16], a wide range of empirical investigations has examined the role of ingroup favour-
itism [17–19]. However, no attempt has been made thus far to consider both perspectives
simultaneously and to systematically test both mechanisms against each other. The aim of the
present study is to contribute to the existing literature by closing this gap. We reveal if and
how belonging to a social group affects an individual’s perceived and actual trustworthiness.
Specifically, we shed light on whether one particular social group–signalling high social status–
appears and acts more trustworthy than another–signalling lower status–or, rather, if trust
operates on the basis of shared group memberships.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: we first outline our theoretical consid-
erations regarding status as a basis of trust as well as concerning cultural preferences as a signal
of social status and ingroup favouritism. From these considerations, we derive our research
hypotheses about musical preferences as a signal of social status, social status as a signal of
trustworthiness and ingroup favouritism. Subsequently, we illustrate the experimental design
and our data collection. We then present the results of our trust game experiment, discuss our
findings and draw conclusions for the literature on trust, cultural sociology, and social
inequality.
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Theoretical background
We juxtapose two lines of theoretical reasoning: trust may either be driven by the signalling of
social status or by shared group memberships. The former mechanism implies that individuals
tend to trust members of one particularly trustworthy group–irrespectively of their own group
affiliation. The latter suggests that persons place trust in others with whom they share a mutual
social category. In the following sections, we present both theoretical arguments and the
respective empirical literature.
Signalling of social status as a basis for trustworthiness
One way in which group-based trust could operate is that the majority of people trust mem-
bers of one specific group above average. From this perspective, decisions to trust another per-
son are shaped by the trustee’s group, being considered as generally trustworthy or
untrustworthy. This implies that placing trust is independent of the trustor’s own group mem-
bership. Empirical research has shown that individuals tend to hold positive views of high-sta-
tus groups [20]. Thus, we suggest that status is a basis of trustworthiness.
High social status correlates with benevolent and cooperative behaviours and, thus, trust-
worthiness. There are a number of arguments for this relationship. From a rational-economic
perspective, high-status individuals are better-endowed with resources. This implies that they
have the financial and cognitive means to act in favour of others, experience less pressure to
maximize their own resources and have fewer incentives to exploit others [21–23]. This rea-
soning is corroborated by strain theory [24]: those who are well off are able to conform with
(cooperation) norms while the disadvantaged only have the option to deviate in order to
achieve their goals. From this point of view, high-status individuals comply more strongly with
moral standards, such as reciprocating trust, than low-status individuals. A similar argument
can be made based on the social norm of noblesse oblige [25]. Here, the association between
high social status and trustworthiness is generated by the moral obligation of “those of higher
rank to be honorable and generous in their dealings with those of lower rank” (25, p. 320).
Thus, high-status individuals experience stronger societal pressures to act in a socially respon-
sible manner, which includes behaving fairly and cooperatively and reciprocating trust
[22,26,27]. Taken together, these theoretical considerations suggest that high social status cor-
relates with high levels of trustworthiness.
There are a number of studies indicating that social status and trust in fact correlate. How-
ever, only a handful were explicitly designed to examine the impact of group status on trustful-
ness and trustworthiness. A pioneering study of status and trust is a field experiment by Falk
and Zehnder [15]. They conducted a trust game experiment with participants from different
residential districts in Zurich, either characterised by high or low socioeconomic status. Partic-
ipants could decide how much of their endowment in the game they would like to send to the
person they were matched with–conditional upon the district the receiver lived in. The results
showed that subjects tended to invest more money–and, thus, to place more trust–into resi-
dents of high-status areas. In addition, findings showed that persons from high-status districts
were also more willing to reciprocate trust by repaying their investor, which implies that resi-
dents of wealthy districts were not only perceived as more trustworthy, but indeed proved to
be more reliable interaction partners. Somewhat similar results were produced in a study by
Cox and colleagues [28]. They ran public-goods games in rural India, bringing together partic-
ipants from high- and low-caste backgrounds. In those conditions where participants were
informed about others’ caste background, cooperation was highest among groups made up
only of high-status participants and lowest among groups consisting solely of low-status partic-
ipants; results for mixed groups were in-between. These findings, in general, indicate higher
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trustworthiness of higher-status groups. Remarkably, these studies–as our own research
endeavour–are rare examples of relevant previous research conducted with a non-student
sample, increasing the generalisability of results. Further empirical inquiries related to our
research include those of Trifiletti and Capozza [29], who performed a trust game with partici-
pants from low-status Southern Italy and high-status Northern Italy and observed that low-sta-
tus group members trusted high-status group members more. However, high-status
participants proved to be the more tolerant players: unlike low-status subjects, they did not dif-
ferentiate by status, but rather trusted low- and high-status group members similarly. Employ-
ing the same paradigm, Lei and Vesely [16] induced artificial income differences in a
laboratory experiment. Thus, this research differs from Falk and Zehnder [15], Cox and col-
leagues [28] and Trifiletti and Capozza [29]–as well as from the present study–in one central
aspect: here, the status differences were no real-life disparities, but fabricated by the researchers
for the duration of the experiment. Findings showed that subjects trusted ‘rich’ (high-status)
participants more than ‘poor’ (low-status) ones. This status-effect was observed for both low-
and high-status subjects and persisted even when initial income inequalities were removed.
Qi, Li and Du [30] also conducted a trust game experiment with artificial income differences.
In a first step, the authors let participants rate the trustworthiness of persons shown in photo-
graphs and provided (fictitious) information about the displayed person’s income. Here, the
authors found that more affluent characters were rated more trustworthy than those with
lower incomes. In a second step, they examined if these judgements would also lead to differ-
ential investments in a trust game and concluded that, indeed, high-income individuals were
not only rated as more trustworthy, but also received more money in the game. As a last exam-
ple from the realm of trust games, Berger [31] studied whether individuals displaying a high
willingness to pay for eco-friendly products were trusted more than those preferring cheap but
non-green products. Results showed that persons who paid a ‘green premium’ received more
trust and also reciprocated trust more strongly.
Also scientists employing research methods other than trust game experiments have shown
a relationship between social status and perceived trustworthiness. For instance, Keijzer and
Corten [32] conducted a vignette experiment designed to simulate peer-to-peer market plat-
forms where participants had to make trusting decisions based on a potential seller’s character-
istics, including socioeconomic status (education and occupational prestige). Findings showed
that higher status led to higher perceived trustworthiness; in addition, they revealed that high-
status individuals were rewarded more for positive reviews for past selling exchanges than
low-status actors. Even more general evidence is produced by survey studies, which show that
persons of higher status, usually measured by education, are more trusting (see [33] for an
overview). However, these studies do not analyse trustworthiness of individuals.
Nonetheless, it has to be noted that there is also research indicating that individuals with
high social status tend to be less cooperative interaction partners. For example, Piff and col-
leagues [34] conducted four separate studies to investigate how participants’ social status (mea-
sured through self-reported subjective social status and/or based on their income) correlated
with their prosociality. Results revealed that lower social status is associated with more proso-
cial behaviour: compared to high-status subjects, low-status participants were more generous
(in a dictator game), declared greater support for charity (when asked which percentage of
their salary people should spend on charitable donations), expressed more trust in strangers
(via investments in a trust game) and were more likely to help another person in distress (by
voluntarily taking on time-consuming tasks). Another strand of research has investigated the
corrupting effects of power on individuals’ prosociality. In her review of the relevant empirical
literature, Fiske [35] concludes that persons in power–who usually have high social status–
tend to be egocentric, fail to take the needs of others (particularly those of lower status) into
PLOS ONE Is participation in high-status culture a signal of trustworthiness?
PLOSONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232674 May 5, 2020 4 / 23
account, discriminate against their subordinates and exploit others. This is, for instance, also
illustrated by the findings of Bendahan and colleagues [36], who conducted an experiment in
which they employed variations of the dictator game to examine if more power would lead to
higher levels of antisocial behaviour. Subjects were randomly divided into powerful ‘leaders’
and powerless ‘followers’. The researchers then bestowed power on the leaders by assigning
them followers (either one or three) and three or four choices of how to divide money between
themselves and their followers. The three choices were altruistic, fair and antisocial distribu-
tions of how to divide the money. The four choices included in addition a very antisocial
option. Results showed that with increasing power (more followers, more choices), subjects’
tendencies to exploit their followers by choosing the antisocial (and very antisocial, if available)
option grew significantly. This experimental research coincides with older case study research
on urban working-class communities, emphasizing their reliance on solidarity and trust within
social networks of family, kins and neighbours [37,38]. These results emerged in contrast to
the middle-class perceptions of such neighbourhoods as disorganized slums and indicated the
high degree of trust available and necessary to conduct everyday live in such poor
communities.
To summarise, there is empirical evidence for both a positive and a negative effect of social
status on trust and cooperativeness. The present research aims at contributing to this ongoing
debate.
In light of our theoretical considerations and the empirical evidence showing that persons
of high status are perceived as more trustworthy and also reciprocate trust more often, we feel
confident to formulate the hypothesis that social status positively correlates with the likelihood
of being trusted and repaying that trust. We test this empirically in our experimental research.
However, social status is not directly observable in many situations. For instance, persons
in contemporary societies usually do not follow a formal dress code, but dress casually in their
everyday lives [39]. Yet, there are a range of indicators which reveal and signal social status
and, thus,–possibly–one’s trustworthiness and cooperativeness [40]. These indicators can, in
the terminology of signalling theory, either be seen as inadvertent signs or deliberate signals.
While signs are “anything in the environment that is perceptible and by being perceived hap-
pens to modify our beliefs about [. . .] someone” (36, p. 170), signals are “observable features of
an agent which are intentionally displayed for the purpose of raising the probability the
receiver assigns to a certain state of affairs” (ibid.). Here, we argue that participation in high-
brow culture may either be a sign (merely correlating with behaviour) or a signal (i.e., an
intentional demonstration) of high social status and, thus, of trustworthiness. By the term
high-brow culture, we refer mainly to the classical forms of art like classical and chamber
music, visual arts, opera, theatre and ballets in western societies. It is not assumed that these
are in any way intrinsically aesthetically superior to popular and folk culture. The term high-
brow culture refers to the fact that these forms of art are still consumed by highly educated
groups with high social status and are seen as a signal of status [41]. This is clearly the case in
Switzerland, where our experiment was conducted. Survey evidence shows that a preference
for classical music is seen as one of the strongest differences between higher social classes, who
prefer classical music, and lower social classes, who do not [42]. Furthermore, Swiss cultural
discourse in leading quality newspapers still focuses more on high-brow culture. Moreover,
cultural policy mainly supports classical culture like classical orchestras, theatres, museums
and operas, on which more public funds are spent than on all other leisure and sports activities
combined [43,44].
There are theoretical and empirical arguments that consumption of high-brow culture is a
sign of social status: following Bourdieu [13], cultural preferences are a central component of
an individual’s habitus, which is shaped by social class membership. Bourdieu [13]
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demonstrates that the dominant groups in society can be identified by their cultural practices,
e.g. a preference for classical music, and their ability to aestheticize all forms of art. By consum-
ing culture in accordance with this aesthetic attitude, upper-middle class and upper-class indi-
viduals are able to distinguish themselves from members of the lower classes, to show their
adherence to and familiarity with “legitimate” (classical) culture and to evoke admiration and
reverence from members of the lower classes. This “legitimate” culture is also supported by its
institutionalization in cultural policy, educational systems and public discourse. Bourdieu uses
this term despite its normative connotation to critically identify the processes that transform
the cultural preferences of the higher status groups into a dominant culture that creates wide-
spread awe in society. In his empirical studies on the aesthetics and lifestyles of different social
classes, Bourdieu shows that it is, above all, musical taste that classifies persons: “. . .nothing
more clearly affirms one’s class, nothing more infallibly classifies, than tastes in music” (13,
p. 18). In Bourdieu’s approach, the dominant cultural order is internalised by all members of
society and is habitually enacted. This implies that an aesthetic preference for high-brow cul-
ture is not an intentionally chosen signal of high social status, but an inadvertent sign thereof.
Note that there is an ongoing discussion if classical highbrow culture is still a sign of high social
status in contemporary societies [45]. We do not want to contribute to this discussion and
with regard to this study we stick to Bourdieu’s [13] original formation and take classical
music as a strong sign of high social status.
On the other hand, there are arguments from signalling theory that displays of musical
tastes can be regarded as intentional signals of social status. To illustrate this, we briefly outline
what we mean by signalling. We follow Gambetta [46] by specifying two criteria for a signal-
ling sequence. “(i) There is some action the receiver can do which benefits a signaller, whether
or not he has the quality k [. . .] (ii) this action benefits the receiver if and only if the signaller
truly has k, and otherwise hurts her”. With respect to status and trust, this means: a signaller
(the trustee) will benefit from being trusted, whether or not she actually is trustworthy. How-
ever, the receiver (the trustor) benefits from trusting the signaller if–and only if–he or she truly
has this quality. Situations of this type may lead to a sorting equilibrium if an honest signaller
has lower costs for signalling a certain unobservable quality compared to a dishonest signaller.
On the premise that consuming high-brow culture is associated with lower costs for individu-
als with high status–for instance, because of their socialisation, education, available time and
ability to appreciate such arts–, it appears plausible that high-brow culture consumption is an
effective signal for status (and, thus, trustworthiness) only if the signaller truly possesses this
trait. Thus, a sorting equilibrium, in our case, is based on the existence of true beliefs on the
relationship between cultural tastes, social status and trustworthiness. We will analyse the exis-
tence of such true beliefs as part of our experimental study.
Whether an inadvertent sign or a deliberate signal, an association between classical music
consumption and (perceived) socioeconomic status has been observed in numerous empirical
investigations [42,43,47–50]. Thus, the preference for classical music demonstrates member-
ship of the higher-status groups and can be assumed to create awe, respect and trust in all
members of society. But not only the dominating classes, but also the lower-status groups are
characterised by their cultural tastes. While the former lean towards high-brow arts, the latter
tend to exhibit more popular preferences. The lower-status groups thus favour art forms
designed to offer simple and lightweight entertainment [13,51]. In the realm of music, this
encompasses genres featuring casual, easy-going rhythms, instruments and lyrics, such as tra-
ditional folk music (‘Volksmusik’). An empirical link between a fondness of folk music and
lower socioeconomic status, particularly lower educational levels, has been shown in a number
of studies [48,52–55]. Therefore, we employ a preference for folk music as a sign of low-class
membership.
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In addition to relying on the literature on the relationship of individuals’ music tastes and
their (perceived) social status, we complement findings of previous research with data from
our own sample. We analysed whether lovers of folk and classical music are perceived differ-
ently in terms of their social status by the subjects in our study. We can show that lovers of
classical music are indeed seen as being of higher status by both folk fans and classic enthusi-
asts (detailed results are provided in the results section).
In sum, we deduce our first two propositions from the reasoning outlined above:
Status perception hypothesis. Consumers of high-brow culture are attributed higher social
status by others, irrespectively of the observer’s own cultural preferences.
Status hypothesis. Consumers of high-brow culture (i) are perceived as more trustworthy
and (ii) behave more trustworthy compared to consumers of low-brow culture.
Ingroup favouritism and trust
In contrast to the reasoning outlined above, one can also argue that group-based trust operates
on grounds of common group memberships and that individuals are more likely to place trust
in others with whom they share a group identity. This mechanism is known as ingroup favour-
itism or ingroup bias [56–59]. It describes individuals’ tendency to treat others with whom
they share group identities (members of their ingroup) differently from people they have no
group membership in common with. They tend to hold more positive views of ingroup mem-
bers [56,60,61] and treat themmore favourably [59,62–64]. Ingroup favouritism also has con-
sequences for people’s perceptions of others’ trustworthiness and their decisions to trust them
[60,65–67]. From this point of view, shared group memberships are crucial for trust and coop-
eration [6,11].
There are different explanations for ingroup favouritism in the literature. We focus on
social identity theory and bounded generalized reciprocity theory here. Social identity theory’s
basic assumption is that humans derive their self-concept not only from their individual, but
also from their social identity [68,69]. By assigning themselves and others to social categories,
individuals gain “cognitive tools that segment, classify, and order the social environment, and
thus enable the individual to undertake many forms of social action” (63, p. 16). Through this
process of self-categorisation, individuals begin to identify with a group–their ingroup. Subse-
quently, they adopt the group’s identity, become emotionally attached to it and, eventually,
their self-esteem gets linked to that of the group. Consequently, individuals seek to bolster
their group’s image–and, thereby, their self-image–by drawing social comparisons to out-
groups that shed a positive light on the ingroup [69]. This sequence of categorising, identifying
and comparing eventually results in a bias for the ingroup, which manifests itself in the ten-
dency to view attitudes and behaviours of ingroup members more favourably than those of
outsiders [70].
An important alternative to the social identity explanation of ingroup bias is based on reci-
procity. From this perspective, social identity theory has overlooked the fact that in the typical
experimental tests of this theory, individuals are not only categorized in groups, but also
exhibit a specific interdependence structure. In many experiments, subjects have to divide cer-
tain resources among ingroup and outgroup members and, thus, their individual outcome is
dependent on the decisions of other participants. By removing this interdependence structure,
for instance by giving parts of the experimental group a fixed individual outcome, ingroup
bias disappears [71]. Thus, bounded generalized reciprocity theory assumes that ingroup bias
is not based on social identity, but on self-interest. Participants maximize their own outcomes
based on the assumption that ingroup members will reciprocate their own ingroup bias (group
heuristic) [72]. In meta-analyses and cross-cultural studies, this perspective receives stronger
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empirical support than social identity theory [73,74]. However, with our research design we
are only able to distinguish between the role of status and ingroup bias; we are not able to dis-
tinguish between different theoretical explanations of ingroup bias.
How ingroup favouritism moderates trust has received considerable attention in previous
research–with mixed results. Banuri, Eckel andWilson [75], for instance, implemented a trust
game between inhabitants of different residential colleges at Rice University. They find an
interaction effect with the costs of trust: there is a strong ingroup bias when favouring ingroup
members is cost-free. However, there is only moderate ingroup favouritism when trusting is
costly. Tan and Vogel [76] analysed ingroup bias in the context of trusting people from differ-
ent religions. However, they find no evidence for ingroup bias. This is in line with other
research on national or ethnic groups: some do observe ingroup favouritism [19], while others
do not [17]. Some studies even discover outgroup favouritism [77] or discrimination against
one particular group, even by its own members [18]. Another strand of research examines
trust between members of “minimal groups” [69], i.e. based on artificial criteria with no real-
life relevance. Güth, Levati and Ploner [78], for example, randomly assign participants to
group “X” or group “Y”; here, the authors detect no effects of group membership on trust in
the trust game. Similarly, Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo [79] split their participants into two
meaningless groups at random: “red” and “blue”. They find no evidence for ingroup favourit-
ism but, instead, moderate outgroup derogation.
From the theoretical considerations outlined above, we derive our final research
hypothesis:
Ingroup hypothesis. Individuals (i) perceive members of their ingroup as more trustworthy
than members of the outgroup and (ii) behave more trustworthy towards members of their
ingroup compared to outgroup members, irrespective of the cultural legitimacy or social status of
each group.
Methods and data
We conducted an online experiment to investigate how group membership affects intra- and
intergroup trust. In the following section, we provide a detailed description of the trust game
paradigm, the strategy vector method, the sampling procedure and the resulting sample.
The trust game
We implemented the trust game [80], which is the most simple abstract representation of real-
life trust situations. In the trust game, two participants are paired. One takes the role of the
trustor and the other the role of the trustee. In our implementation, both players are endowed
with 20 Swiss Francs (CHF) (approx. USD 20). The sender (the trustor) can send any share–
i.e., none, some, or all–of this endowment to the receiver (the trustee). The amount is then tri-
pled and the receiver can decide to return anything between nothing and everything to the
sender.
The logic of the game is as follows: if both players seek to maximise joint payoffs and an
equal distribution, the sender should send everything and the receiver should reciprocate so
that both receive half of the joint payoffs. More specifically, the sender invests the entire
endowment of CHF 20 and the receiver returns CHF 40 (the receiver receives 3� CHF 20 + 20
(initial endowment) = CHF 80 and, by splitting it in half, both end up with CHF 40). However,
if the sender follows this logic and the receiver is a rational egoist, she is tempted to exploit the
sender’s trust and keep the entire CHF 80 (leaving the sender with CHF 0). Thus, the sender
may be hesitant to invest a large proportion of her endowment and might only send some or
none of it, foregoing a potentially greater payoff but, at the same time, protecting her initial
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endowment. Therefore, the sender’s decision is a measure of placing trust and the receiver’s
decision of trustworthiness (reciprocating trust).
The strategy vector method
To test our hypotheses, our implementation of the trust game includes information about the
group membership of the trustee. Hence, trustors are asked to specify how much of their CHF
20 endowment they will send if they are paired with a classical music and folk music enthusi-
ast, respectively. This is done by going through all possible combinations using the strategy
vector method [81,82]. This method resembles factorial surveys (vignette experiments)–with
the difference that decision are payoff-relevant: at the end of the experiment, each subject A is
randomly assigned to either the role of sender or receiver and paired with another subject B.
Their respective identities (folk or classic fan) and roles will determine each one’s actual
payout.
More specifically, the following procedure was employed: subjects were asked to state their
decisions for each possible situation before being assigned to the role of sender or receiver.
Thus, we asked all participants (a) “If you were the sender, how much money would you send
to folk music lovers and classical music fans?”, (b) “If you were the sender, which amount
would you expect to receive back from folk music lovers and classical music fans?” and (c) “If
you were the receiver, how much money would you return–conditional upon the amount you
received from the sender–to folk music lovers and classical music fans?”. The sequence of
choices presented to participants during the game is illustrated in Figs 1 and 2.
Participants were informed that–after stating their decisions for all scenarios–they will be
assigned to the role of the sender or receiver and paired with a classic- or folk-loving partici-
pant. All of these decisions are payoff-relevant since the pairing determines which of their
choices is actually paid out. We can illustrate this using an example involving the previously
mentioned subjects A and B. Assume A is a folk lover and assigned to the sender role and B is
a classic fan in the receiver role. Then, the investment A stated for this particular situation–
being the sender and paired with a classic fan–will be transferred to B. Consequently, A will
receive the amount in return that B stated she would return if she received this particular
investment from a folk lover. Each subject could decide to receive their entire earnings (via
mail or bank transfer), which 40.2% of participants opted for, or to donate all or part of their
earnings to a charity organisation (41.1% and 16.7% of participants, respectively). Average
final earnings (irrespective of the decision to keep or donate the money) amounted to CHF
31.92.
To put it differently, these are not merely hypothetical situations (as in vignette experi-
ments), but have real consequences in terms of gaining or losing money. In addition, the strat-
egy vector method has the great advantage to yield substantially more data on subjects’
decisions regarding their trust decisions, trustworthiness and respective beliefs for all combi-
nations of group memberships. Even though the strategy vector method might suffer from
some shortcomings–e.g., mental overload or a lack of emotional involvement, i.e. “cold” deci-
sions–, it is a valuable method yielding rich data. Rauhut andWinter [81] provide a detailed
discussion of advantages and disadvantages in a variety of different applications. Brandts and
Charness [83] review 29 empirical studies comparing the strategy vector method and the direct
response method (only asking for decisions in one scenario). They find that the majority (16)
of those studies finds no difference between the two methods, some (9) report mixed results
and only a handful (4) do find differences. However, “in no case [. . .] a treatment effect found
with the strategy method is not observed with the direct-response method” (72, p. 375). There
are studies that find smaller effect sizes in strategy vector experiments, potentially suggesting a
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cognitive overload for some but not all subjects. Thus, we argue that the strategy vector
method produces potentially too conservative results, which have yet more statistical precision
(smaller standard errors due to more decisions per subject). In addition, it allows a fine-
grained analysis of the complete decision space, which makes it more valuable than data from
direct response trust games. The elicitation of the trust decisions and beliefs about trustworthi-
ness is illustrated in Fig 1.
The following instructions were given to subjects (translated from German):
“On this page, you can make your transfer decisions. Since you do not yet know if you will
participate in this study in the role of the sender or the receiver, we ask you to state your
decisions for both roles. First, you state your decisions as sender. Here, you have to indicate
Fig 1. Trust decisions and beliefs of trustworthiness. The table shows how participants were asked for their investment decisions for the case that they were randomly
allocated to the role of the sender (trustor). They are asked to make their decision in case they are matched with a classical music lover or a folk music lover. In addition,
they are asked about their expected back transfers from each type of player they are matched with. The exact instructions are given in the text and the original
screenshots from the online experiment are in the S1 File.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232674.g001
Fig 2. Trustworthiness decisions. The table shows how participants were asked for their back transfers for the case that they were randomly allocated to the role of the
receiver (trustee). Participants received two separate screens–one for the case that they are randomly matched with a classical music lover and one for the case that they
are randomly matched with a folk music lover. All else remains unchanged. These two variants are indicated with brackets and text in italics, i.e.: classical music fan [folk
music fan]. The exact instructions are given in the text and the original screenshots from the online experiment are provided in the S1 File.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232674.g002
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how much you send to each receiver group, i.e. to classical music fans and to folk music
fans. Transfers can be made in steps of 2 (i.e. 0, 2, 4, . . ., 20 CHF). In the first row of the
decision table, you state how much you would send if the receiver was a classical music
lover. In the second row, you indicate how much you would send if the receiver was a folk
music lover. In the case the receiver is a folk music fan, your decision for “folk music lovers”
will come into effect. In addition, we are interested in your expectations concerning back
transfer. Given your investment, how much do you expect to receive in return? Please indi-
cate how much you except back given the other person is a classical music fan or a folk
music fan in the corresponding row.”
The elicitation of trustworthiness decisions is illustrated in Fig 2.
The following instructions were given to subjects (translated from German):
“In the table below, you can enter your decisions regarding your back transfers in case you
are assigned to the role of the receiver. Here, you have to indicate how much you would like
to send back in case the sender is a classical music fan and in case the sender is a folk music
fan. In the first column, you can see all possible investments the sender could choose from.
Next to this column, you can see the resulting account balances given the senders invest-
ment choice. These are the account balances prior to your back transfer. Lastly, you see the
column “Which amount do you transfer back to the classical music fan [the folk music
fan]?” Here, you insert your back transfer decision. Since you do not yet know howmuch
the other person invests, you have to choose for each possible investment which amount
you would like to return. In the first row, you indicate how much you would like to return
given the sender invested 0 CHF. In the second row you indicate how much you would like
to return given the sender invested 2 CHF. It is essential that you state your back transfer
decisions for all 11 possible investments. In each row, you can indicate any back transfer,
i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . 80 CHF. Given the other person invests 4 CHF, the decision you made for
“4 CHF” will come into effect; assuming the other person invests 10 CHF, the decision you
made for “10 CHF” will come into effect; etc.”
Sampling procedure and participants
We sampled persons who clearly identified as either folk music lovers (low-brow culture) or
fans of classical music (high-brow culture). Therefore, the conditions specified in the literature
on ingroup favouritism are clearly fulfilled. Participants were recruited via two different chan-
nels. First, we reached out through advertisements on media dedicated to classical music (e.g.
Radio Swiss Classic newsletter, classicpoint.ch website) or folk music (e.g. Alpenrosemagazine,
volksmusiknet.ch website). Second, suitable candidates were selected from a representative
online survey conducted by the Link Institute Lucerne based on their music preferences.
Both recruitment procedures yielded a sample of 102 participants. Our final sample com-
prises of 63 classical music fans and 39 folk music fans. Each subject made 26 statements about
intended investments, expected back transfers and intended own back transfers conditional
upon the received investment, which results in 2’652 decision clustered in 102 individuals.
The average age is 49.9; classical music fans are on average 49.4 years old and folk music
fans 50.6. There are 52% women in our sample; among the classical music fans, 63.5% are
female, among the folk music lovers 33.3%.
All aspects of the study design have been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty
of Arts at the University of Zurich. Potential subjects were invited through various platforms
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and self-selected into participation, thereby expressing their consent to partake in the study.
Therefore, we opted to forego an additional form where participants explicitly signed their
consent. Data was analysed anonymously.
Results
In order to assess the status perception hypothesis, we analysed whether lovers of folk and clas-
sical music fans are perceived differently in terms of their social status. Participants were asked
to state their impressions of the occupational prestige, economic success and educational levels
of both folk music fans and classical music lovers on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = not at all to 5 =
very). Specifically, participants were asked to answer six separate questions (three regarding
their perception of folk lovers, three with respect to their judgments of classic fans): (a) How
prestigious are occupations of folk fans [classic fans] typically? (b) How economically success-
ful are folk fans [classic fans]? (c) How educated are folk fans [classic fans]? Subjects rated clas-
sical music fans higher on each dimension. They assessed classical music lovers’ typical
occupations as more prestigious compared to folk fans’ (average ratings 3.92 vs. 2.78,
p = 0.000), judged classic enthusiasts as more economically successful (average ratings 3.85 vs.
3.00, p = 0.000) and as more highly educated (average ratings 4.19 vs. 2.89, p = 0.000). Folk
and classic fans did not differ significantly in their ratings of these attributes of the two groups
(detailed reports of differences between folk and classic lovers in the perception of status
related attributes can be found in S1 Table in S2 File). Therefore, it is clearly established that
classical music lovers are seen as of higher status by members of both groups. Bourdieu’s idea
that classical music is a sign of high status is therefore corroborated.
In addition to perceived status differences, we examined actual status differences between
the folk and classic fans in our sample in terms of their highest educational qualification (rang-
ing from “basic secondary education” (1) to “doctorate” (7)). We focused on status in terms of
education for practical reasons: first, we did not collect information on participants income;
second, a large proportion of our sample indicated no (current) profession (n = 38, i.e. 37.25%
of all participants), instead stating “job seeking” (n = 1), “housewife”(n = 2), “student”
(n = 13), or “pensioner” (n = 22). Our analyses showed that there is a significant correlation
between music preferences and education level (χ2(6) = 17.41, p = 0.008). More specifically,
regressing music preferences on education level reveals that with each additional level of edu-
cation, the probability of stating a preference for classical music (rather than folk music) rises
by 9 percentage points (average marginal effect of education level, p = 0.001). Thus, classic and
folk music lovers in our sample were not only perceived as of different social status, but actu-
ally did differ in this regard, at least with respect to educational attainment. While only per-
ceived status differences are directly relevant to the status perception hypothesis as well as to a
successful manipulation of status in the experiment, this finding further corroborates our
claim that music preferences correlate with social status.
In the next step, we explore descriptives about trust, beliefs about trustworthiness and
actual trustworthiness. Fig 3 shows the distributions of investment decisions (panel A),
expected back transfers (panel B) and back transfers averaged over the strategy vector method
data (panel C) in Swiss Francs across all participants (n = 102).
Fig 3A illustrates a considerable heterogeneity in trust decisions. Decisions span the full
range from no trust (investment of CHF 0) to full trust (investment of CHF 20) with an aver-
age of 11.79 (SD = 5.44). The majority of subjects invests either half (18.6%) or all (16.67%) of
their endowment, expressing considerable trust into the trustee. Investments of zero occur
only rarely, which implies that only a very small minority (1%) acts as rational egoists. Fig 3B
shows that most people think they will receive at least some of their investments back. The
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average expected back transfer is 17.66 (SD = 15.90), two thirds of participants expect a return
between CHF 4 and 30. None of the participants predict to receive nothing in return; there is
also a small fraction (6%) of subjects who expect a hyper-fair back transfer of more than CHF
40 (i.e. more than half of the sum that is maximally available for both). As apparent in Fig 3C,
returns of CHF 0 do indeed not occur at all, most transfers (2/3) range between CHF 10 and
21 with a mean of 17.46 (SD = 7.15).
We next turn to testing the status and the ingroup hypothesis. Fig 4 presents an overview of
subjects’ decisions contingent on whom they are matched with (classic or folk). It shows the
effect of group membership on trust, beliefs about trustworthiness and actual trustworthiness.
To examine these effects, we calculated the differences between the means of (a) investments
into classic fans and investments into folk enthusiasts, (b) expected back transfers from classic
lovers and expected back transfers from folk fans and (c) actual back transfers from classic
types and actual back transfers from folk lovers (details on group means and differences can
also be found in S2 Table in S2 File). To test for statistical significance of these differences, we
performed t-tests; in addition, we report Cohen’s d as a measure for effect sizes.
If high-brow cultural preferences indeed signal social status and thus trustworthiness, we
should observe larger investments into the high-status group (i.e. classic fans) as well as higher
expected and actual back transfers from this group, irrespectively of participants’ own music
preferences. If, however, trust and trustworthiness hinge upon shared group membership (that
is, if there is an ingroup bias), we should observe greater investments into one’s ingroup as
well as larger expected and actual returns from the in- than the outgroup.
Fig 4A depicts mean investment decisions. The left part of Fig 4A reveals investment
choices into receivers belonging to the low-status and the high-status group, independently of
Fig 3. Trust, beliefs about trustworthiness and actual trustworthiness averaged over all groups. x-axes depict the amount (in CHF) participants stated they send
(panel A), they expected back (panel B) and they transfer back (panel C); averaged over all back transfer decisions. Y-axes indicate percentage values.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232674.g003
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participants’ own music preferences. The difference between investments into folk and classic
enthusiasts is small (CHF 0.22) and statistically insignificant (p = 0.616, d = 0.05), which rejects
the status hypothesis.
The right part of Fig 4A shows investments into recipients belonging to one’s ingroup com-
pared to those belonging to the outgroup. In other words, ingroup refers to cases where classic
types invest into other classic types or folk types who invest into other folk types. Outgroup
refers to cases where classic types invest into folk or folk types invest into classic. Here, we find
clear support for the ingroup hypothesis: on average, subjects invest CHF 2.14 more if the
receiver shares their own music taste (p = 0.000, d = 0.57).
Fig 4B shows expectations about back transfers (i.e. beliefs about trustworthiness). Expected
returns from the folk-lover group compared to those from the classic fans group are displayed
on the left. The difference between expected back transfers from folk and classic fans is slightly
larger than for investments. On average, subjects expect to receive CHF 1.33 more back from
classical music lovers than from folk music lovers. This difference, however, is not statistically
significant at the 5%-level (p = 0.095, d = 0.17). Again, these findings reject the status hypothe-
sis. The right half of Fig 4B reveals expected returns from in- versus outgroup members. Here,
we see a much larger gap. When paired with an ingroup member, participants expect CHF
3.35 more in return than when matched with an outgroup-receiver. This difference is statisti-
cally significant (p = 0.000, d = 0.45). This corroborates again the ingroup hypothesis.
Fig 4C shows average actual back transfers. These are computed as mean back transfers
averaged over all received transfer possibilities. Back transfers from the high-status group
exceed those from the low-status group by CHF 1.16 (left). This difference is, however, not sig-
nificant (p = 0. 0.429, d = 0.16). Actual back transfers from the ingroup exceed those from the
outgroup by CHF 0.76. This is statistically significant (p = 0.047, d = 0.20). This finding is the
third evidence supporting the ingroup hypothesis and rejecting the status hypothesis.
Fig 4. Investments, expected and actual back transfers: Low- vs. high-status group and in- vs. outgroup. x-axes depict the amount of CHF participants stated they
would invest (panel A), they expected back (panel B) and they would transfer back (panel C; mean over all back transfer decisions) conditional upon their counterpart’s
group membership; for each panel, the left part compares decisions when paired with a low-status vs. high-status partner, the right part decisions when paired with an in-
vs. an outgroup partner; significant differences are indicated above the bars; � p<0.05, �� p<0.01, ��� p<0.001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232674.g004
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We additionally examined if these findings are driven by group-level patterns, i.e. if there
are systematic differences between the choices made by folk and classic fans. We thus investi-
gated if the differences we find for investments, expected back transfers and average actual
back transfers in favour of the ingroup can also be observed when folk or classic oriented par-
ticipants are considered separately. This is indeed the case. As above, we used bivariate mean
comparisons and performed t-tests to test for statistical significance of any differences. We
find that folk music fans invest CHF 2.51 (p = 0.001, d = 0.57) more into the ingroup than the
outgroup, expect CHF 2.64 (p = 0.005, d = 0.48) more in return from the ingroup and send an
additional CHF 1.87 (p = 0.040, d = 0.34) back when paired with an ingroup member (com-
pared to an outgroup member). Classic fans also exhibit a pronounced ingroup bias, investing
CHF 1.90 (p = 0.000, d = 0.57) more and assuming higher back transfers (+ CHF 3.79,
p = 0.001, d = 0.45) when matched with a fellow classic lover; in terms of actual back transfers,
however, there is no ingroup bias (+ CHF 0.08, p = 0.763, d = 0.04) in this group.
It should be noted that the differences compared above are not normally distributed. We
believe that this does not affect the results in the present case: analyses rely on a sufficiently
large sample size which ensures that the tests have sufficient statistical power and yield robust
results even if the normality condition is not satisfied [84–86]. We nevertheless performed
additional nonparametric tests to solidify the claims regarding statistical (in)significance of
results. We complemented each t-test with a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests as
well as sign tests of matched pairs to forestall any doubt asymmetries in the distributions
might cast on the results of the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. Results confirm the
conclusions inferred from the t-tests: in each instance, the test statistics of all tests correspond
in terms of whether or not to reject the null hypothesis (detailed results of all tests can be
found in S3 Table in S2 File).
In sum, we find that–overall–subjects trust folk fans and classic lovers to similar degrees
and that they do not perceive the latter group as more trustworthy. Thus, there is–in contrast
to the status proposition–no signalling effect of cultural consumption on trust. Instead, we
find strong evidence for ingroup-based trust and more optimistic beliefs about back transfers
from ingroup members. However, actual back transfers are much less group-biased: here, we
only observe ingroup favouritism among folk music fans, but not among classical music
lovers.
Taken together, these results refute the status hypothesis and lend support to the ingroup
hypothesis. Our findings show that people tend to base their trust decisions on shared group
membership and assume that ingroup members are more trustworthy. However, the observa-
tion that actual behaviour–that is, back transfers–is much less group-biased suggests that peo-
ple hold unjustified stereotypes: trust is largely reciprocated independently of trustees’ group
memberships. Thus, in a nutshell, classic trusts classic and folk trusts folk but this bias works–
at least for classic fans–through false beliefs about group-based trustworthiness.
We now take a closer look at the discrepancy between beliefs and actual behaviour. Fig 5
compares expected back transfers and actual back transfers across all interactions for all partic-
ipants and for the two groups separately.
In the left panel, average expected back transfers (black bars) and the corresponding actual
back transfers (grey bars) are compared for all possible received investments from CHF 0 to 20
(x-axis). The dashed red lines refer to the minimum amount that has to be transferred so that
senders receive at least their investments in return. The solid green lines refer to a fully equal
split, i.e. the amount that can be expected from a maximally prosocial, fully inequality-averse
trustee. In other words, the area in between both lines refers to back transfers where senders
do not experience losses (minimum) up to the cases where they receive a fully equal split (max-
imum). The right panel illustrates the extent of false beliefs (mismatches between beliefs and
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outcomes). Downward (upward) deviations imply an underestimation (overestimation) of
back transfers.
Fig 5 shows that back transfers exceed investments for all possible decisions except those of
CHF 0; thus, every potential investment results (on average) in a positive payoff for the sender.
Overestimations of back transfers only occur at the fringes of the range of possible investments
in the extreme cases of investing nothing or everything: only those who invested none of the
endowment tend to expect much greater back transfers than those who sent only a share or all
of their initial CHF 20. Additionally, the results show that, on average, participants are less
trusting than what would be rational given the average back transfers. This result holds irre-
spectively of group membership. For investments between CHF 2 and CHF 20, subjects largely
misjudge the returns they will gain given the amount they invested and, therefore, both groups
have false beliefs about the trustworthiness of their interaction partners.
In a next step, we examine if these systematic misjudgements are also affected by ingroup
biases. To this end, we compare the difference between the back transfers participants expect
for their investment and the amount they actually do receive in return. We make this compari-
son for trust game encounters of members of the same group (ingroup encounters) as well as
of members of different groups (outgroup encounters). Specifically, we compute the difference
between expected back transfers and average actual back transfers for each particular invest-
ment level for both ingroup and outgroup encounters. We then estimate the effect of an
ingroup encounter (dummy variable = 1 for ingroup encounters, = 0 for outgroup encounters)
Fig 5. Expected vs. actual returns. Panel A: average expected back transfers vs. actual back transfers (y-axis) for all possible received investments (x-axis). The green
solid line refers to the minimum back transfer such that senders receive what they have sent. The dashed red line refers to the respective amount, where the back
transfer represents an equal split of joint earnings. The area in between the solid red and the dashed green line refers, therefore, to the space where the minimum
marks sending decisions without losses and the maximum refers to what can be expected from a maximally prosocial (i.e. fully inequality averse) trustee. Panel B
refers to the difference between expected and actual back transfers.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232674.g005
PLOS ONE Is participation in high-status culture a signal of trustworthiness?
PLOSONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0232674 May 5, 2020 16 / 23
on the extent of the gap between expectation and actual back transfers. In other words, we ana-
lyse if interacting with someone from one’s own group reduces the divergence between expec-
tations and actual eventual returns while holding the amount one invested constant. We
employ a linear regression model with clustered standard errors and include the difference
between expected back transfers and average actual back transfers for each investment level as
the dependent variable, the ingroup-encounter dummy as our main independent variable and
a control for investment levels. We find that there is a substantial difference with regard to the
accuracy of beliefs in ingroup versus outgroup encounters. The coefficient of the ingroup-
encounter-dummy is negative (-1.92) and statistically significant (p = 0.011; detailed regres-
sion results are provided in S4 Table in S2 File). This result implies that the misjudgement is
less pronounced when a participant is matched with an ingroup member and, thus, that shared
group membership does improve predictions about one’s interaction partner’s trustworthi-
ness. From this regression and the analysis above, it follows that actors are more optimistic
and better informed about the trustworthiness of ingroup than outgroup members.
Conclusion
This article set out to explore how group membership affects trust and trustworthiness. We
contrasted two theoretical mechanisms. Individuals may place more trust in persons signalling
high social status via a preference for classical music or they may trust people from their own
group to a greater extent. We operationalised group membership by musical tastes, i.e. high-
vs. low-brow cultural consumption. Our evidence shows that lovers of classical music are per-
ceived as of higher social status compared to fans of folk music–by all participants. However,
concerning the receiving and giving of trust, our experimental data rejects status effects and
supports ingroup favouritism. Subjects trust folk fans and classic lovers to similar degrees and
do not perceive the latter group as more trustworthy. This results is somewhat at odds with
findings of previous studies employing the same experimental paradigm, whose results largely
do demonstrate that persons of higher social status receive more trust. This discrepancy
between prior work and the present study might be due to our operationalisation of social sta-
tus via musical preferences. While the majority of previous studies manipulated status via very
visible, straightforward indicators–such as living in a region commonly known as wealthy or
disadvantaged [15,29], being member of a certain caste [28] or known income differences
[16,30]–, our manipulation may have been more subtle. Our manipulation check clearly shows
that knowledge about persons’ musical preferences does indeed evoke a certain perception of
their status. However, it appears plausible that the association of musical tastes with status
might happen on a less conscious level than that of income with status and, thus, might shape
interactions to a lesser extent. This is a question that can only be answered empirically and
may be a fruitful direction for future research.
Participants do, however, place significantly more trust in members of their own group and
expect them to be more trustworthy. This expectation is shown to be partially unwarranted.
Actual back transfers are much less group-biased: here, we only observe ingroup favouritism
among folk music fans, but not among classical music lovers. Thus, when it comes to recipro-
cating trust, the bias for one’s ingroup is much less pronounced, which suggests that ingroup
bias is, at least in part, driven by false beliefs. However, it is difficult to generalize from our
example, since in other cases ingroup preferences may be based on true beliefs. This seems a
very important question for further research.
Interestingly, we find that ingroup favouritism is most consistent among low-status (folk-
music loving) participants. In this group, we observe strong ingroup favouritism across all
trust-measures. This result suggests that the bias for ‘insiders’ is most pronounced in the low-
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status group, while the high-status group demonstrates a greater tolerance of ‘outsiders’. This
implication of our findings is somewhat in line with evidence from research on prejudice and
discrimination. In this field of study, it has repeatedly been shown that individuals with low
socioeconomic status tend to be less accepting of members of various outgroups such as immi-
grants [87], sexual minorities [88] or the homeless [89].
We highlight two implications of our results for social theory: firstly, with respect to Bour-
dieu’s theory of social classes and “legitimate” culture and, secondly, concerning signalling
theory.
Regarding Bourdieu’s theory of class and “legitimate” culture, it is indeed the case that–as
hypothesized by Bourdieu–lovers of classical music are perceived as being of higher status
than fans of folk music. This is, also supporting his theoretical assumptions, true for members
of both groups in our study. Thus, not only classical music lovers perceive themselves as high
in status and folk-music fans as lower in status, the same is true for folk music fans. As theo-
rized by Bourdieu, engagement in high-brow culture is a sign of high status, which is perceived
as such throughout different groups of the society. However, Bourdieu went further in his the-
oretical discussions and assumed that high-brow culture is a form of “legitimate” culture in
society because it is associated with persons of high social status and power and institutional-
ized in school curricula and cultural policy. According to Bourdieu, this status of “legitimate”
culture should produce awe, reverence and trust in all members of society. Our results did not
support the hypothesis that high-status individuals are trusted to a greater extent. Classical
music lovers were not perceived as more trustworthy than folk music fans. Therefore, our
results do not support the idea that contemporary societies exhibit something like a hierarchy
of cultural tastes, where some tastes are considered as “legitimate” and dominant, thus engen-
dering trust. Different taste groups are able to recognise their differences, but adherents of
other tastes do no invest more trust in those who participate in high-brow culture [51,90].
Signalling theory assumes that, in a sorting equilibrium, the honest signaller has lower costs
in producing a certain signal compared to a dishonest signaller. Thus, a certain signal–like, in
our case, musical preferences–should reflect underlying objective differences–such as different
levels of trustworthiness–between the signallers. In a sorting equilibrium, the trustees have a
true belief that a certain signal is a true signal of trustworthiness. However, we found that
respondents had clear preferences for trusting their ingroup members. In our study, these
preferences have been shown to be partially based on false beliefs–at least among members of
the high-status group. This is somewhat at odds with findings from previous research demon-
strating that expecting greater prosociality from one’s ingroup is well-justified. Evidence sug-
gests that shared group memberships increase empathy and one’s sense of (ingroup)
responsibility [91] and that even infants already expect more support and helping behaviour in
interactions between persons belonging to the same group than between individuals belonging
to different groups [92]. Our own results that trust-related ingroup bias is to some extent
unwarranted could be explained in two ways. Firstly, we can assume that our results are not
based on a sorting equilibrium, but are simply a snapshot of transient interactions. Since both
of our groups are likely to have previously interacted with members of their own ingroup
(because interpersonal networks are strongly shaped by cultural preferences), this explanation
is rather unlikely though [93]. A second possible explanation could be that some false beliefs
are highly stable, in spite of contradictory evidence, as, for instance, suggested by the continu-
ing success of cons. Thus, future research on signalling should take the possibility of stable
false beliefs much more into account.
Another aspect that future research should take into account is social status at the “trusting
end”: in the present study, the main research interest was in whether high-status individuals
would be perceived as more trustworthy and if they would be more likely to reciprocate the
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trust invested in them (i.e., social status at the “trust-receiving” end). A question that was not
of central interest here was whether persons of high social status would also be more inclined
to place their own trust in others. Research has shown that (induced) high social status can
indeed lead actors to perceive their interaction partners as more benevolent and, consequently,
to be more trusting [94]. Given Bourdieu’s [13] arguments that persons adhering to cultural
tastes signalling high social status are treated with deference by others, they may be more
inclined to assume that others have good intentions. Therefore, it appears plausible that, also
in the context of culture-based groups, social status might shape intra- and intergroup trust in
terms of one’s propensity to grant trust to others. While preliminary analyses based on our
data do not suggest that members of high-status groups tend to be more trusting than those of
lower-status groups (see S5 Table in S2 File), a more thorough exploration of this proposition
might still present an interesting and fruitful avenue for future research.
Aside from their scientific value, our findings have implications with respect to improving
the establishment of trust in interactions between strangers. On the one hand, the results of
our study imply that interactions between members of different groups can be biased by false
expectations about uncooperative behaviour of outgroup members. Raising awareness for this
“statistical discrimination by false beliefs” may be a first step to ameliorating cooperation
between unacquainted individuals. On the other hand, our results support the well-established
assumption that a common culture enhances trust and cooperation [12] and are relevant in
many contexts where trust has to be newly established on a regular basis–for example, in work
contexts where employees collaborate in frequently changing team configurations.
However, there are some limitations to our research design. Firstly, subjects were recruited
via advertisements (websites, magazines) or contacted directly after they participated in a cul-
ture survey and could sign up for the experiment. Therefore, we have a self-selected sample of
persons clearly identifying as classical music lovers or as folk music fans. This might bias the
results towards ingroup favouritism. However, this is contradicted by the fact that both groups
have rather realistic assessments of their own group’s social status. Secondly, the strategy vec-
tor method has sometimes been criticized for potentially leading to mental overload or for suf-
fering from a lack of emotional involvement (“cold” decisions). Despite this criticism, we
argue that the strategy method produces more reliable data than survey questions or vignette
studies–since decisions are directly payoff-relevant–and also yields a richer dataset than tradi-
tional (lab or online) experiments employing the direct-response method. Lastly, Switzerland–
unlike many of its neighbours–lacks a strong own tradition of high-brow culture. Even though
the cultural discourse in Switzerland is quite traditional, high-brow culture has been less domi-
nant in its society than in those of other European countries because of the absence of princely
courts (e.g., France, Germany, Italy); there even prevails a kind of sturdy resistance towards its
elitism in the common population [44]. Thus, the effects of participation in high-brow culture
might be less pronounced than in societies with a strong tradition of such cultural practices.
Thus, there should be some replications of our study in countries, which have a stronger orien-
tation towards high-brow culture. This would clarify the debate on the relevance of status-
effects versus ingroup preferences further.
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References
1. Coleman JS. Social capital in the creation of human capital. Am J Sociol. 1988; 94:S95–120.
2. Coleman JS. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press; 1990.
3. Henrich J, Boyd R, Bowles S, Camerer C, Fehr E, Gintis H, et al. “Economic man” in cross-cultural per-
spective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behav Brain Sci. 2005/12/22. 2005; 28
(6):795–815. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X05000142 PMID: 16372952
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